Economic, social and political reasons for support of, and opposition to, the Nazis to 1933 (A level History)

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Nazi Party 1924 Onwards

With their leader in prison, the party and the SA both banned and split up the future of the Nazi party seemed in doubt. Whilst in Landsbery fortress Hitler became certain that the only way to gain power would be through legal means, and after gaining power through the polls, build a dictatorship. This looked like a long process as the party had split up into smaller fractions, without clear leadership, and the severe crisis of the German economy had come to an end. The army had also lost interest in overthrowing the government of joining with right wing groups.

Whilst Hitler was in prison two major groups formed from the Nazi party, but fortunately for Hitler both groups supported him. In December 1924, when he was released on parole the party was in a similar state to 1919. Hitler pledged to follow a legal route to power, although this would prove difficult as he was banned from making public speeches in Bavaria, and many other states.

During his nine months inside he came to various conclusions about the future of the Nazi party. Putschist tactics would have to be abandoned, and instead electoral support would have to be gained; the party needed more organisation and structure and needed to expand beyond Bavaria and Hitler’s will would dominate the party for the party to appear united.

Hitler realised that he was going to have to reinvent the party into a national organisation, although one of the first thing he announced after leaving prison was that he wanted to remain an unconditional and all-powerful leader of the party. In Munich they accepted him back without much question, although outside Munich, Hitler had more trouble because of the differing political beliefs within the country. The more socialist north believed that the party needed to become more socialist if it was to succeed and they wanted the party to compete for more votes in the large urban and industrial areas. Hitler tried to keep his own views private, but believed that making the party more socialist would alienate the middle classes in Munich, and antagonise the conservative groups whom he thought he needed to collaborate with in order to achieve power.

The ‘Strasser’ wing (Gregor and Otto) continued to push Hitler to make the party more socialist, supporting the policy of confiscating land of the former Hohenzollern princes and redistributing to local peasants, if they were to gain power. Hitler was opposed to it as he felt it would alienate those who would help him in his future militaristic nation. To resolve this dispute Hitler called a meeting, including members from both wings of the party at Bamberg on 4th February 1926. Bamberg was close to Munich, so it was easier for the non-socialists to attend. The real issue of the meeting was whether the party would continue to be ruled by one Fuhrer, or whether authority would come from the party programme, which would be altered by pressure from different parts of the party. At the meeting, Hitler gained support for him to continue as undisputed leader. He also asked members to reaffirm their support for the 1920 programme of the party, which was considered ‘unalterable.’ As the ‘expropriation’ of monarchical land had never been included in these original ideas, Hitler persuaded the northern wing to drop the idea. Before the meeting, Hitler had persuaded Goebbels to his side that helped him to enforce his authority. By 1926 Hitler had successfully managed to re-establish disciplined control over the party.

Hitler’s achievement in reuniting the party was a very small one, as all he was leading was a small and insignificant party that seemed to have little change of becoming a major force in German politics. The improved conditions of post-1924 did not help a party that thrived on despair.

The decision of the party to follow the legal route meant that the party had to distance itself from various paramilitary groups that had previously supported it. There was also the issue of attracting voters, Hitler’s speaking could not be relied on because, for the time being, there was a speaking ban on the Nazi leader, which remained in place until September 1928.

After much discussion, Hitler was persuaded by the socialist north to adopt the ‘Urban Plan’ in 1926. This involved building up support in the industrial cities, competing directly with the KPD and the SPD. From 1926-onwards the party adopted a strong anti-capitalist tone, and persistently attacked the ‘decadence’ of the upper middle classes for supporting the Weimar Republic. Although Hitler was sceptical, he went along with the plan. Not surprisingly, the plan was a failure as workers stayed loyal to the KPD and SPD. In 1928 Hitler abandoned the plan, and although did not abandon trying to gain support from the working classes, focused more on the middle-classes and disaffected rural voters.

Germany Post-1924

The second half of the 1920s has been described as the ‘golden years.’ This is because of the way life improved in Germany compared to the troubles that occurred in 1923. To some, it seems that the Weimar government may finally settle down and take root. A new currency was introduced at the end of 1923, the French left the Ruhr in 1923 and a new deal was struck on the reparations. Germany’s relations with both Britain and France improved under the guidance of Gustav Stresemann. In 1926 Germany entered The League of Nations.

One of the plans which helped Germany most was the Dawes plan that reorganised the Reichsbank, reduced the total reparations payments and spread out the payment into a billion marks each year to 1929, and 2.5 thereafter. The most crucial factor was the agreement for allied loans to Germany for 800 million gold marks to help Germany pay the first revised payment. This also opened the country to American investment. Between 1924 and 1929 loans of up to 22.5 billion marks were given to Germany. The Dawes plan passed through the Reichstag in August 1924, but the nationalists fiercely opposed the plan, objecting to Germany’s financed being controlled by foreign powers.

During Stresemann’s 103 days as chancellor passive resistance in the Ruhr was called off, an unpopular move which gave the impression that Germany was once again being forced to surrender and admit its own weakness, and, as described above lead to threats from the far right.

Outward sign were that Germany had recovered, unemployment fell, inflation was steadied, wages rose and to the rest of the world it seemed that Germany was reborn. In what appeared to be a stable climate the appeal of extreme groups fell.

Although many new industries were very prosperous, there were people in Germany who felt that it was “dancing on a volcano.” Their concerns were not unfounded, agriculture was still the biggest single employer but prices had been falling sharply and many employers resented the concession granted to workers in the early days of the Weimar republic. The employers looked to gain back the power they felt they had lost to the Trade Unions in 1919. Even the prosperity of some industries was fragile. The growth rested on foreign export markets and US capital. Some saw that if the market or capital dried up, disaster could follow.

During the “Golden Years” life for many Germans did improve. New welfare schemes meant there was a more comprehensive unemployment scheme by 1927 and wages increased. By 1927 Germany’s industry was producing product at the same rate as before the war.

There were certain groups of people who did not benefit during the “golden years.” The hyperinflation had helped big businesses to pay off their debts and make large profit, thereby increasing the divide between rich and poor. The “lower middle class” who were no better off than the working class, but who were more skilled, were particularly unhappy as they felt that neither the big business nor the communists who had support mainly from the working classes represented their interests.

Another group of people who did not prosper were the agricultural workers. Lack of profit made it hard for farmers to modernise so they could not compete in foreign markets. This led to further debt and many could not improve on their inefficient farming methods. In 1929 agricultural production was still 74% of its pre-war levels.

The farmers were one group of people who were first to vote for the Nazis and other extremist groups. In 1928 many farmers rioted in protest at their circumstances. The lower-middle classes also followed the farmers in voting for the Nazis.

The conditions between 1924-1929 were very varied, and for some, bad enough to encourage them to vote for extremist parties, blaming the Jews and Communists for their economics problems.

Throughout the ‘Golden Years’ there were certain features of the government and economy that prevented Germany ever recovering fully. The Treaty of Versailles meant that Germany was losing 3% of its GDP, which was a significant amount, alongside this there were many other world economies win difficulty. Britain’s industrial production levels were still below pre-war levels. For trade, Germany was being undercut by Japan whose economy had soared. Europe was also experiencing a drop in population making the export market shrink. Domestically, industrial production was still low and slow to modernise, and in those businesses where modernisation occurred unemployment rose, as each worker individually became more productive.

Economic Collapse

The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 returned economic gloom to Germany. The country was so heavily affected because the stability of the country was built on the US loans, which ceased after the crash. In the winter of 1928 unemployment was 2.5 million but by the following winter it had risen to 3 million are reached a high of 6 million. In the easily 1930s it was estimated that around half the working population was without a job. Thousands of small firms collapsed and smaller farms went bankrupt. Diseases such as TB and pneumonia reappeared and infant mortality increased. For those who had a job, their incomes fell.

The circumstances made the problems the Weimar system faced more evident. In 1928, Hermann Muller, a Social Democrat, was appointed chancellor of the ‘Grand Coalition’ representing five political parties, both left and the moderate right. The broad spectrum of political opinion made making decisions difficult and the economic situation heightened their differences. The fundamental problem they faced was a deficit in the Reich budget, the government was spending more than it was receiving, partly due to the inadequate unemployment scheme, unable to cope with the growing numbers of unemployed. The SDP wanted to raise the levels of contributions to the scheme, whilst the DVP wanted to reduce the value of unemployment benefits, lightening the tax burden. The parties found it hard to cooperate and could not tackle the crisis effectively.

The government also faced problems from the far right, as many far right groups united in denouncing the Young Plan as foreign powers dictating Germany’s fortunes. The Nazis gained some political respect through their association with the DNVP, and also publicity from Hugenberg’s newspaper.

Following Muller’s resignation in March 1930, Heinrich Bruning was appointed chancellor. Hindenburg was influenced by Schleicher to exclude the SPD from his cabinet, the first step towards eliminating the left wing from German politics. As a consequence, Bruning was left with little support in the Reichstag and unable to pass laws. Bruning stated in his memoirs that he preferred a more authoritarian style of ruling and was content to bypass the Reichstag using Article 48. The first crisis arose in July 1930 when the Reichstag rejecting part of Bruning’s finance bill which as intended to balance the budget. Bruning used article 48 to bypass the Reichstag, the first time such a move had been made after a bill had been defeated. The Reichstag passed a motion demanding that the decree was withdrawn, and Bruning’s response was to dissolve the Reichstag and call an election. This election gave Hitler the ideal opportunity to play on the anxiety of middle-class and rural voters in the midst of a depression. The election gave the Nazi party a major surge in the number of seats rising from 12 to 107, gaining 18% of the votes. In one vote the party had risen to prominence in German politics. In the vote, the Nazis were not the only party to grow; the KPD increased their seats from 55 to 77. Bruning now faced opposition from at least 64% of the Reichstag and the DNVP was also refusing to work with Bruning and the SPD remained outside the government. Fortunately, the SPD did support Bruning, knowing that if his government fell, a Nazi-nationalist government may replace it, which would be much worse. Bruning had to continue to use Article 48 to pass laws.

Many of the voters who voted for the Nazi party were starting to register their protest during a period of economic hardship, although this is only half explains why the Nazis experienced such a surge in support. Adolf Hitler and the efficient Nazi propaganda machine gave voters an outlet for their frustration. Nazi rallies were much better organised than any other party’s and gave the feeling to many that they were being caught up in something more like a religious movement than a political party.

In April 1932, Hindenburg was re-elected for a second term. The left failed to provide a joint candidate and therefore created a situation where the left and centre voted for the right wing Hindenburg just to keep Hitler out. Bruning was still chancellor at this point, but his economic decisions were making him increasingly unpopular. In particular wage cuts, reduced welfare payments and a falling standard of living reduced his popularity. Hindenburg was also losing confidence is his chancellor, partly because Schleicher was urging him to create an even more right wing government. Schleicher believed that the Nazis had to be in the government if it was going to be supported by the Reichstag and started secret meetings with Hitler. Finally Hindenburg removed permission to use Article 48 and Bruning was forced to resign in May 1932.

Brunign was replaced by Papen, with Schleicher as his defence minister. Most of the members of the rather aristocratic cabinet – ‘the Cabinet of Barons’ – were not members of the Reichstag and had no ties to a particular political party. In July 1932, Paper called a general election, which led to a massive increase in support for the Nazi party. Papen aimed to continue Bruning’s policy of ruling by decree, but after the election of 1932, where the Nazis gained 230 seats, his position became more difficult. The two largest parties in the Reichstag, the Nazis and the KPD both aimed to destroy democracy in the Weimar republic and the controlled more than half the seats between them.

Hitler refused to work with the Paper government because, after the Nazis’ performance in the 1932 election Hitler felt that he should be chancellor. Papen felt that he now had to bring the Nazis into the government, but he did not want it to be solely on Hitler’s terms. Papen tried to persuade Hitler to unite with the DNVP, but Hitler refused, insisting the he be appointed Chancellor of nothing.

In the election of November 1932 the Nazis lost 34 seats, although still remained the largest party by some distance. Papen was prepared to dissolve the Reichstag permanently; to create a ‘presidential dictatorship’ and use the army to crush any opposition but Schleicher persuaded Hindenburg that this would end in civil war, with the Nazis and the communists fighting out the future of Germany on the streets. Hindenburg was coming under pressure from within the army and amongst leading industrialist to appoint an authoritarian right-wing government. In the conservative press there were calls for a constitutional dictator to pull Germany out of the political paralysis she was in. Hindenburg was still unsure about handing power to Hitler, but there were some within Hindenburg’s circle who believed that Hitler could be ‘tamed’ if he was given power.

Hindenburg still ignored Hitler’s claims to lead Germany and Schleicher was appointed chancellor on 2nd December 1932, making Papen furious. Schleicher’s first announcement was that he was to tackle unemployment, and he hoped that he would have Hitler’s support, but the Nazi leader refused to do so. To try and gain some legitimacy, Schleicher tried to appeal to the more ‘socialist’ wings of the Nazi party, opening talks with trade unions and repealing Papen’s unpopular anti-trade union laws. He even made Gregor Strasser vice chancellor, although all these moves came to nothing when the trade unions rejected his talks and Strasser was forced to resign from the Nazi party. His moves also had the effect of making powerful industrialists and landowners wary of his tactics and they began to see Hitler as the lesser of two evils.

Papen was aware of Schleicher’s failures and decided to seize his chance for revenge. He decided that a government led by Hitler, and with him as vice-chancellor was his best option. This would give him huge support in the Reichstag and he gambled on the fact that he could control a limited number of Nazis in the cabinet. On 4th January Hitler and Paper moved towards an agreement, and started to persuade Hindenburg. Papen felt that the Nazis’ drop in support in November 1932 was a sign that their support was falling. Hindenburg refused Schleicher’s request to dissolve the Reichstag and he resigned on thhe 28th January. Two days later, Hindenburg reluctantly appointed Hitler as chancellor and a cabinet was formed containing 3 Nazis and 9 other conservatives.

Electoral Success of the Nazis

The Nazis never achieved a majority vote in the Reichstag, nor were they technically voted into power, but it was their extraordinary success at the polls that brought them into the government.

The effects of the Wall Street Crash could have benefited the communists more than the Nazis, as unemployed workers were more likely to vote for the KPD than the Nazis and the depression could have further reduced belief in the German capitalist system, however the communists were weakened by the lack of a charismatic leader and lack of cooperation with the SPD. The increasing influence of Russia on KPD policies did not help their popularity with German voters. The KPD can also be seen as to have helped the Nazi’s increase their popularity as fear of communism encouraged many to vote for the far right or encouraged those who had no previously voted. The right-wing elite’s determination to keep the communists out helped them to power considerably.

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